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Abstract: Rationality is a fundamental concept in economics. Most researchers will accept that human beings are not fully rational.
Herbert Simon suggested that we are \bounded rational". However, it is very di±cult to quantify \bounded rationality", and therefore
it is di±cult to pinpoint its impact to all those economic theories that depend on the assumption of full rationality. Ariel Rubinstein
proposed to model bounded rationality by explicitly specifying the decision makers0 decision-making procedures. This paper takes
a computational point of view to Rubinstein0s approach. From a computational point of view, decision procedures can be encoded
in algorithms and heuristics. We argue that, everything else being equal, the e®ective rationality of an agent is determined by its
computational power { we refer to this as the computational intelligence determines e®ective rationality (CIDER) theory. This is not
an attempt to propose a unifying de¯nition of bounded rationality. It is merely a proposal of a computational point of view of bounded
rationality. This way of interpreting bounded rationality enables us to (computationally) reason about economic systems when the full
rationality assumption is relaxed.
Keywords: Rationality, bounded rationality, computational intelligence, economics, computational intelligence determines e®ective
rationality (CIDER) theory.
1 Introduction: What is rationality
Many economic theories are built upon the assumption
that decision makers (people or institutes) are perfectly ra-
tional. Being rational means being able to maximize one
0s
utility, given all the available information. Here we assume
that utilities can be quanti¯ed; whether this is true or not
it does not a®ect the argument in this paper.
Suppose a merchant receives two o®ers to buy one of
his commodities: one o®ers $10 and the other $20. With
everything else being equal, the merchant, being \rational",
will sell it for $20.
Full rationality is an assumption behind all major eco-
nomic theories. For example, the e±cient market hypoth-
esis states that security prices always fully re°ect the in-
formation available
[1]. Should this hypothesis hold, no in-
vestor can consistently beat the market; this means that no
investor can expect to consistently get a return on its invest-
ment higher than the return that the market can o®er. This
hypothesis has many consequences in ¯nancial analysis, and
therefore is very important in economics. For a market to
be \e±cient", among other assumptions, a su±cient num-
ber of the investors in the market must be rational. In
recent years, the e±cient market hypothesis has become
under serious scrutiny, both theoretically (e.g. see [2,3])
and empirically (e.g. see [4]). The rationality assump-
tion is seriously questioned by researchers in behavioural
¯nance, which studies the cognitive and emotional biases
on investors and their impact on investment decisions
[5]. In
the rest of the paper, we examine what rationality really
means, with focus on the computation aspect of decision
making.
2 Rationality involves computation
It is easy to choose between selling an item for $10 or
$20, everything else being equal. Suppose a merchant is
o®ered the choice between 1) receiving a payment of $100
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today, and 2) receiving a payment of $10 per month over 12
months. Which option should he take? With basic mathe-
matical and ¯nance training, and the knowledge of his cost
of capital, a \rational" merchant should have no problem
choosing between the two o®ers.
The above example highlights the fact that knowledge
is required in making certain \rational" decisions. In fact,
\being rational" requires more than basic knowledge. It
also requires computation. In the above example, the cal-
culation is relatively simple; it can be performed on a simple
calculator.
Let us turn to another scenario. Supposed a merchant
has to visit his customers, who are located far apart. Trav-
elling from one customer to another involves a cost, which
may vary depending on the time and distance to travel.
Some customers may not be available at all times. Sup-
pose the merchant wants to plan an itinerary that visits all
his 100 customers, with the objective to minimize travel-
ling costs and satisfying all the customers
0 availability con-
straints.
A \rational" merchant would attempt to ¯nd the optimal
itinerary in the above problem. The amount of computation
required to ¯nd the optimal itinerary in this problem is non-
trivial. This is a complicated version of a problem known as
the \travelling salesman problem", which has been studied
extensively in operations research and computer science
[6].
Clever heuristics have been invented to tackle the travel-
ling salesman problem (e.g. see [7,8]), but they typically in-
volve serious computation. The problem is in nature nonde-
terministic polynomial-time hard (NP-hard), which means
that the time required to ¯nd the optimal solution grows
exponentially as (in our example) the number of customers
increases. Given a ¯xed amount of planning time, one may
not be able to ¯nd the optimal itinerary (i.e. an itinerary
with the minimal travelling cost). In that case, one would
have to settle for the best itinerary found within the given
time.
It is also worth noting that computation itself involves a
cost. Knowledge acquisition (e.g. to ¯nd out the travelling
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agent should not only minimize travelling cost. It should
attempt to minimize the travelling cost plus the cost of
computation and knowledge acquisition.
3 Bounded rationality
But then what does \being rational" mean? One is not
perfectly rational if one cannot ¯nd the optimal itinerary.
Simon
[9] pointed out that most people are only partially
rational. He suggested to describe human as \bounded ra-
tional", which means they can only make the best deci-
sions within their knowledge and resources. Although most
economists would accept that perfect rationality is not a re-
alistic assumption, it is not clear how most of the economic
theories should be revised to re°ect bounded rationality.
Concretely quantifying what bounded rationality means re-
mains a grand challenge to the research community.
Many have attempted to study the interpretation or im-
plication of bounded rationality. Some investigate the psy-
chological aspect of rationality (e.g. see [10]). To enable
one to quantify an agent
0s rationality, it would be useful
if one could provide a mathematical de¯nition of bounded
rationality; for example, \agent A is 86% bounded ratio-
nal". Then one may be able to revise economics theories to
re°ect the level of bounded rationality. Unfortunately, no
such de¯nition has been widely accepted.
As decision makers have to make decisions about how
and when to take what actions, Rubinstein
[11] proposed to
model bounded rationality by explicitly specifying decision
making procedures. This is an attractive approach, as it en-
ables one to study the consequences of bounded rationality.
Rubinstein
0s proposal puts the study of decision procedures
on the research agenda. This is the view that we shall follow
in this paper.
4 A computational point of view in
bounded rationality
From a computational point of view, decision procedures
can be encoded in algorithms and heuristics. One way to
study the impact of relaxing the full rationality assumption
is to study the impact of adopting di®erent algorithms and
heuristics in the agents. One important impact that one
can study is the equilibrium of a situation when the algo-
rithms and heuristics are speci¯ed for the players. One can
also attempt to study the equilibrium of a market given a
model of the agents
0 algorithms and heuristics. It is worth
noting that these studies are nontrivial and not always fea-
sible. The studies themselves may involve computational
intelligence too. We shall look at some case studies later in
the paper.
So far, we have argued that specifying the algorithms
and heuristics enables one to study the equilibrium in the
market. It is important to point out that the search for
algorithms and heuristics itself is interesting: it is interest-
ing from an individual
0s point of view, if one wants to ¯nd
out what algorithms and heuristics will succeed in a given
market situation.
Because of combinatorial explosion, ¯nding the optimal
algorithms and heuristics is out of reach in most realistic
problems. When optimal solutions are out of one
0s reach,
one
0s knowledge of algorithms, heuristics and our computa-
tional power determine e®ectively how good a solution one
can ¯nd. For example, in the travelling salesman problem,
some algorithms and heuristics ¯nd better solutions than
others.
If one de¯nes full rationality as \being able to ¯nd the
optimal decisions in every situation", then it is reasonable
to say that the \level of optimality" that one achieves de-
¯nes one
0s e®ective rationality. Thus, designing better algo-
rithms and heuristics helps to extend the rationality bound-
ary. In other words, computational intelligence determines
one
0s e®ective rationality { we refer to it as the CIDER
theory.
5 Where do decision procedures come
from?
So far, we have not asked the question where decision
procedures come from. Procedures can be designed, as it is
the case in many disciplines of computational intelligence.
They can also be evolved, as it is the case in evolutionary
computation. In this section, we shall brie°y outline some
of the relevant disciplines in computational intelligence.
The general problem solver (GPS) was an early attempt
in arti¯cial intelligence to mimic human intelligence
[12].
The idea is to separate domain-speci¯c knowledge from the
reasoning mechanism. GPS is designed as a general rea-
soning mechanism. GPS opened the ¯eld of arti¯cial in-
telligence planning, which is still an on-going research area
in arti¯cial intelligence
[12; 13]. Planning involves knowledge
representation (how to represent beliefs, actions and their
e®ects), causal reasoning (reasoning about actions and their
consequences), and resources allocation (primarily time re-
sources, i.e. when to perform which action).
Rationality is often studied in the context of decision
problems. Finite choice decision problems are tackled in
constraint satisfaction, a discipline that brings together re-
search in arti¯cial intelligence, logic programming and op-
erations research
[14; 15]. Constraint satisfaction is a general
problem which appears in practical problems such as in-
dustrial scheduling. Search algorithms have been designed
to use constraints to ¯nd solutions e±ciently. Procedures
implementing these algorithms could be used to model ra-
tionality.
Human beings ¯nd strategies by iterative improvements.
Starting from their current situations, they look at pos-
sible changes or experiment with them. They change
their strategies in response to the anticipated or actual
changes. Research that fall into this pattern are called lo-
cal search
[16; 17]. It would be reasonable to model human
rationality by local search procedures.
Human beings learn from their experiences. Therefore, it
would be reasonable to model rationality with dynamic (as
opposed to static) procedures. Evolutionary algorithms (in-
cluding estimation of distribution algorithms
[18]) attempt
to evolve solutions instead of designing them
[19; 20]. It would
be a reasonable idea to model human reinforcement learning
with evolutionary computation procedures, or procedures
generated by evolutionary computation.
6 Case study: Evolutionary computa-
tion in game theory
In this section, we present a case study to demonstrate
that bounded rationality can be reasoned when procedures
are speci¯ed. This case study is the two-player alternating-
o®ers bargaining scenario in the ¯eld of game theory
[21].
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much (in terms of percentage of the overall resources) they
demand on the resources. Both players have incentive to
compromise as their utilities drop over time.
The traditional approach to game theory is to derive sub-
game equilibrium mathematically
[22]. Perfect rationality is
assumed in such derivations. Jin and Tsang
[23] relax this
assumption, and attach procedures to the players (as sug-
gested by Rubinstein
[11] in Section 3). This enables them to
study subgame equilibrium under the given procedures
[23].
The procedures used by Jin and Tsang
[23] are constraint-
directed genetic programming procedures (a branch of evo-
lutionary computation). Constraint-directed genetic pro-
gramming is novel in its own right, but in this paper, we
focus on the fact that the constraints that Jin and Tsang
[23]
used implement \common sense" that one would expect a
human player to use. Examples of these constraints are:
1) one does not ask for more than 100% of the resources;
and 2) the faster one
0s utility drops, the less aggressive
one would be in bargaining
[24]. Another aspect of Jin
and Tsang
0s work is that the players co-evolve
[23; 24]. Co-
evolution implements reinforcement learning or arm-races,
which is quite common in human society.
In many game models where mathematical results have
been derived, subgame equilibrium produced by the evolu-
tionary approach produced very similar results
[23¡25]. This
means, at least for these simple game models, the perfect
rationality assumption has not made any di®erence to the
equilibrium. It would be interesting to see whether this is
still the case in more complex game models.
This case study support
0s Rubinstein
0s proposal: it
demonstrates that once the decision procedure is speci¯ed,
one can study the subgame equilibrium without assuming
perfect rationality. In this case, the decision procedure and
the constraints that were adopted implement realistic be-
haviour in human societies.
7 Case study: Computational intelli-
gence determines agent performance
In this section, we use a few examples to demonstrate
that market equilibrium can be studied through procedural
attachments. Besides, we demonstrate that procedures can
be learned. Furthermore, the algorithm that an agent uses
determines how successful it could be.
Selten
[26] pointed out that quantitative reasoning is typ-
ically infeasible. To better understand bounded rational-
ity, Selten
[26] proposed to better understand the \structure"
used by business and public administration. He promoted
the use of qualitative reasoning. Special attention was paid
to causal reasoning, in the form of causal diagrams, which
are directed graphs with edge labels.
Alexandrova et al.
[27; 28] modelled the card payment mar-
ket in both the structure and the quantitative implications.
An agent-based approach is used to study the card payment
market. The agents have their decision process de¯ned.
This allows Alexandrova to study market equilibrium. In
this case, the decision procedure is evolutionary computa-




[28] also studied the market equilibrium
when the agents do and do not evolve. Results showed
that, unsurprisingly, agents that evolve out-perform those
who do not
[28]. This supports the argument that compu-
tational intelligence determines e®ective rationality (under
our de¯nition in Section 4 that optimality is a measure of
rationality).
Alexandrova
0s results are also echoed by related research.
Gosling and Tsang
[25; 31] modelled middlemen strategies in
a supply chain. They demonstrated that e®ective middle-
men strategies could be evolved. Martinez and Tsang
[32; 33]
modelled agents in a stock market. By specifying proce-
dures in di®erent agents (some of which being stationary
and some evolutionary), one is in a position to study the
market behaviour. This enables one to identify conditions
under which the market behaviour resembles real ¯nancial
markets. Martinez and Tsang also showed that trading
strategies can be evolved to beat naive strategies, which
supports the CIDER theory.
8 Remarks: Constraint satisfaction
Rubinstein
[11] pointed out that, in reality, agents do not
necessarily try to ¯nd an optimal decision. An agent
0s task
often involves picking from a ¯nite set of options a deci-
sion that satis¯es all the constraints. In an enterprise, an
agent
0s action will restrict the actions that others can take.
In a centralized decision problem, the coordinator has to de-
cide for all its agents their choices of decision, satisfying all
the constraints. This is known as a constraint satisfaction
problem in the literature
[15].
The task of \¯nding any set of decisions that satis¯es all
the constraints" is typically easier than \¯nding the opti-
mal set of decisions", especially when many solutions exist.
This may have signi¯cant impact to the computation pro-
cedures (see [14] for a catalogue of constraint satisfaction
tools). However, it has no fundamental impact to the analy-
sis above: the problem is still computationally hard. Given
a particular problem, some algorithms are more e±cient
than others in ¯nding solutions { sometimes by several or-
ders of magnitude in terms of solving time. Knowledge of
what algorithms to use under what situations could make
all the di®erence, as pointed out in Section 2. Thus, the
CIDER theory still applies.
9 Conclusions
Rationality is a fundamental assumption in economics.
With the full rationality assumption relaxed, many eco-
nomic theories must be revised. The applicability of many
economic theories to the society must be scrutinized. Un-
fortunately, we are not in a position to revise and scrutinize
these theories, as we do not know how to assess the impact
of relaxing this assumption. Modelling bounded rationality
by procedures is one way forward. It allows one to study
the impact of di®erent procedures. While one
0s model of
individuals
0 procedure may not be perfect, modelling al-
lows one to scienti¯cally study the impact of di®erent pro-
cedures. By adjusting the procedures, one may attempt to
model the underlying mechanism that drives the economy
{ a methodology similar to that used in physics. In this
paper, we have given concrete examples on how bounded
rationality could be modelled by evolutionary procedures,
which are basically reinforcement learning procedures. It
is reasonable to believe that reinforcement learning is what
ordinary people use in daily life decision making. We have
also argued that computational intelligence determines an
agent
0s e®ective rationality.
To summarize, attaching procedures to decision making
is a practical way forward in advancing bounded rational-
ity research. High on the research agenda is how to design66 International Journal of Automation and Computing 05(1), January 2008
or evolve these procedures and how to evaluate their im-
pact. Computational intelligence could play a big part in
answering these questions.
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